We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully proportional representation rules-Chamberlin-Courant's rule and Monroe's rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be NP-hard for unrestricted preferences. We show that for single-crossing preferences this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant's rule, but remains NP-hard for Monroe's rule. Our algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant's rule can be modified to work for elections with bounded single-crossing width. To circumvent the hardness result for Monroe's rule, we consider single-crossing elections that satisfy an additional constraint, namely, ones where each candidate is ranked first by at least one voter (such elections are called narcissistic). For single-crossing narcissistic elections, we provide an efficient algorithm for the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule.
Introduction
Parliamentary elections, i.e., procedures for selecting a fixed-size set of candidates that, in some sense, best represent the voters, received a lot of attention in the literature. Some wellknown approaches include first-past-the-post system (FPTP), where the voters are divided into districts and in each district a plurality election is held to find this district's representative; party-list systems, where the voters vote for parties and later the parties distribute the seats among their members; SNTV (single nontransferable vote) and Bloc rules, where the voters cast t-approval ballots and the rule picks k candidates with the highest approval scores (here k is the target parliament size, and t = 1 for SNTV and t = k for Bloc); and a variant of STV (single transferable vote). In this paper, we focus on two voting rules that, for each voter, explicitly define the candidate that will represent her in the parliament (such rules are said to provide fully proportional representation), namely, Chamberlin-Courant's rule [CC83] and Monroe's rule [Mon95] . Besides parliamentary elections, the winner determination algorithms for these rules can also be used for other applications, such as resource allocation [Mon95, SFS13b] and recommender systems [LB11] .
Let us consider an election where we seek a k-member parliament chosen out of m candidates by n voters. Both Chamberlin-Courant's and Monroe's rule work by finding a function Φ that assigns to each voter v the candidate that is to represent v in the parliament. This function is required to assign at most k candidates altogether. 1 Further, under Monroe's rule each candidate is either assigned to about n k voters or to none. The latter restriction does not apply to Chamberlin-Courant's rule, where each selected candidate may represent an arbitrary number of voters, and, as a consequence, the parliament elected in this manner may have to use weighted voting in its proceedings. Finally, each voter should be represented by a candidate that this voter ranks as high as possible.
To specify the last requirement formally, we assume that there is a global dissatisfaction function α, α : N → N, such that α(i) is a voter's dissatisfaction from being represented by a candidate that she views as i-th best. (A typical example is Borda dissatisfaction function α B given by α B (i) = i − 1.) In the utilitarian variants of Chamberlin-Courant's and Monroe's rules we seek assignments that minimize the sum of voters' dissatisfactions; in the egalitarian variants (introduced recently by Betzler et al. [BSU13] ) we seek assignments that minimize the dissatisfaction of the worst-off voter.
Chamberlin-Courant's and Monroe's rules have a number of attractive properties, which distinguish them from other multiwinner rules. Indeed, they elect parliaments that (at least in some sense) proportionally represent the voters, ensure that candidates who are not individually popular cannot make it to the parliament even if they come from very popular parties, and take minority candidates into account. In contrast, FPTP can provide largely disproportionate results, party-list systems cause members of parliament to feel more responsible to the parties than to the voters, SNTV and Bloc tend to disregard minority candidates, and STV is believed to put too much emphasis on voters' top preferences.
Unfortunately, Chamberlin-Courant's and Monroe's rules do have one flaw that makes them impractical: It is NP-hard to compute their winners [PRZ08, LB11, BSU13] . Nonetheless, these rules are so attractive that there is a growing body of research on computing their winners exactly (e.g., through integer linear programming formulations [PB98] , by means of fixed-parameter tractability analysis [BSU13] , by considering restricted preference domains [BSU13, YCE13] ) and approximately [LB11, SFS13b, SFS13a] . We continue this line of research by considering the complexity of finding exact Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe winners for the case where voters' preferences are single-crossing. Our results complement those of Betzler et al. [BSU13] for single-peaked electorates.
Recall that voters are said to have single-crossing preferences if it is possible to order them so that for every pair of candidates a, b the voters who prefer a to b form a consecutive block on one side of the order and the voters who prefer b to a form a consecutive block on the other side. For example, it is quite natural to assume that the voters are aligned on the standard political left-right axis. Given two candidates a and b, where a is viewed as more left-wing and b is viewed as more right-wing, the left-leaning voters would prefer a to b and the right-leaning voters would prefer b to a. While real-life elections are typically too noisy to have this property, it is plausible that they may be close to single-crossing, and it is important to understand the complexity of the idealized model before proceeding to study nearly single-crossing profiles (in the context of single-peaked elections this agenda has been successfully pursued by Faliszewski et al. [FHH11] ).
Our main results are as follows: for single-crossing elections winner determination under Chamberlin-Courant's rule is in P (for every dissatisfaction function, and both for the utilitarian and for the egalitarian version of this rule), but under Monroe's rule it is NPhard. Our hardness result for Monroe's rule applies to the utilitarian setting with Borda dissatisfaction function. Our algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant's rule extends to elections that have bounded single-crossing width (see [CGS12, CGS13] ). Our proof proceeds by showing that for single-crossing elections Chamberlin-Courant's rule admits an optimal assignment that has the contiguous blocks property: the set of voters assigned to an elected representative forms a contiguous block in the voters' order witnessing that the election is single-crossing. This property can be interpreted as saying that each selected candidate represents a group of voters who are fairly similar to each other, and we believe it to be desirable in the context of proportional representation.
The NP-hardness result for Monroe's rule motivates us to search for further domain restrictions that may make this problem tractable. To this end, we focus on the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule and, following the example of Cornaz et al. [CGS12] , consider elections that, in addition to being single-crossing, are narcissistic, i.e., have the property that every candidate is ranked first by at least one voter. In parliamentary elections, narcissistic profiles are very natural: we expect all candidates to vote for themselves. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule for all elections that belong to this class. Our algorithm is based on the observation that for singlecrossing narcissistic elections under the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule there is always an optimal assignment that satisfies the contiguous blocks property. We show, however, that this result does not extend to general single-crossing elections or to the utilitarian version of Monroe's rule: in both cases, requiring the contiguous blocks property may rule out all optimal assignments.
In a sense, our result for single-crossing narcissistic elections is not new: it can be shown that such elections are single-peaked (this result is implicit in the work of Barberà and Moreno [BM11] ), and Betzler et al. [BSU13] provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule for single-peaked electorates. However, our algorithm has two significant advantages over the one of Betzler et al.: First, it has considerably better worst-case running time, and second, it produces assignments that have the contiguous blocks property. In contrast, if we formulate the analogue of the contiguous blocks property for single-peaked elections, by considering the ordering of the voters that is induced by the axis (see Section 5 for details), we can construct an election where no optimal assignment has the contiguous blocks property; this holds both for Monroe's rule and for ChamberlinCourant's rule (and both for the egalitarian version and for the utilitarian version of either rule).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide the required background, give the definitions of Monroe's and Chamberlin-Courant's rules, and define single-crossing and single-peaked elections. Then, in Sections 3 and 4, we discuss the complexity of winner determination under Chamberlin-Courant's and Monroe's rules, respectively. We show the limits of the contiguous blocks property approach in Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6 by summarizing our results and discussing future research directions.
Preliminaries
For every positive integer s, we let [s] denote the set {1, . . . , s}. An election is a pair E = (C, V ) where C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } is a set of candidates and V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is an ordered list of voters. Each voter v ∈ V has a preference order ≻ v , i.e., a linear order over C that ranks all the candidates from the most desirable one to the least desirable one. For each voter v ∈ V and each candidate c ∈ C, we denote by pos v (c) the position of c in v's preference order (the top candidate has position 1 and the last candidate has position |C|). We refer to the list V as the preference profile.
Given an election E = (C, V ) and a subset of candidates D ⊂ C, we denote by V | D the profile obtained by restricting the preference order of each voter in V to D. We denote the concatenation of two voter lists U and V by U + V ; if U consists of a single vote u we simply write u + V . A list U is said to be a sublist of a list V (denoted by U ⊆ V ) if U can be obtained from V by deleting voters. An election (C ′ , V ′ ) is said to be a subelection of an election (C, V ) if C ′ ⊆ C and V ′ = U | C ′ for some U ⊆ V . Given a subset of candidates A, we denote by A → a fixed ordering of candidates in A and by A ← the reverse of this ordering. Given two disjoint sets A, B ⊂ C, we write · · · ≻ A ≻ B ≻ . . . to denote a vote where all candidates in A are ranked above all candidates in B.
Chamberlin-Courant's and Monroe's Rules
Both Chamberlin-Courant's rule and Monroe's rule rely on the notion of a dissatisfaction function (also known as a misrepresentation function). This function specifies, for each i ∈ [m], a voter's dissatisfaction from being represented by candidate she ranks in position i. We will typically be interested in families of dissatisfaction functions, (α m ) ∞ m=1 , with one function for each possible number of candidates. In particular, we will be interested in Borda dissatisfaction function α m B (i) = α B (i) = i − 1. We assume that our dissatisfaction functions are computable in polynomial time with respect to m.
Let k be a positive integer. A k-CC-assignment function for an election E = (C, V ) is a mapping Φ : V → C such that |Φ(V )| ≤ k. A k-Monroe-assignment function for E is a k-CC-assignment function that additionally satisfies the following constraints: |Φ(V )| = k, and for each c ∈ C either |Φ −1 (c)| = 0 or ⌊ n k ⌋ ≤ |Φ −1 (c)| ≤ ⌈ n k ⌉. That is, both assignment functions select (up to) k candidates, and a k-Monroe-assignment function additionally ensures that each selected candidate is assigned to roughly the same number of voters. For a given assignment function Φ, we say that voter v ∈ V is represented (in the parliament) by candidate Φ(v). There are several ways to measure the quality of an assignment function Φ with respect to a dissatisfaction function α; we use the following two:
Intuitively, ℓ 1 (Φ) takes the utilitarian view of measuring the sum of voters' dissatisfactions, whereas ℓ ∞ takes the egalitarian view of looking at the worst-off voter only.
We are now ready to define the voting rules that are the subject of this paper.
Definition 2 For every family of dissatisfaction functions α = (α m ) ∞ m=1 , every R ∈ {CC, Monroe}, and every ℓ ∈ {ℓ 1 , ℓ ∞ }, an α-ℓ-R voting rule is a mapping that takes an election E = (C, V ) and a positive integer k with k ≤ |C| as its input, and returns a k-R-assignment function Φ for E that minimizes ℓ(Φ) (if there are several optimal assignments, the rule is free to return any of them).
Chamberlin and Courant [CC83] and Monroe [Mon95] proposed the utilitarian variants of their rules and focused on Borda dissatisfaction function (though Monroe also considered so-called k-approval dissatisfaction functions). Egalitarian variants of both rules have been recently introduced by Betzler et al. [BSU13] .
Single-Crossing and Single-Peaked Profiles
The notion of single-crossing preferences dates back to the work of Mirrlees [Mir71] ; we also point the reader to the work of Saporiti and Tohmé [ST06] for some settings where single-crossing preferences are studied. Formally, such elections are defined as follows.
Definition 3 An election E = (C, V ), where C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } is a set of candidates and V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is an ordered list of voters, is single-crossing (with respect to the given order of voters) if for each pair of candidates a, b such that a ≻ v 1 b, there exists a value
That is, as we sweep through the list of voters from the first one towards the last one, the relative order of every pair of candidates changes at most once.
Definition 3 refers to the ordering of the voters provided by V . Alternatively, one could simply require existence of an ordering of the voters that satisfies the single-crossing property. The advantage of our approach is that it simplifies notation, yet does not affect the complexity of the problems that we study: one can compute an order of the voters that makes an election single-crossing (or decide that such an order does not exist) in polynomial time [EFS12, BCW12] .
We also consider single-peaked elections [Bla48] .
Definition 4 Let ≻ be a preference order over candidate set C and let ✁ be an order over C. We say that ≻ is single-peaked with respect to ✁ if for every triple of candidates a, b, c ∈ C it holds that
is single-peaked with respect to an order ✁ over C if the preference order of every voter v ∈ V is single-peaked with respect to ✁. An election E = (C, V ) is single-peaked if there exists an order ✁ over C with respect to which it is single-peaked.
If an election E is single-peaked with respect to some order ✁ then we call ✁ a societal axis for E. There are polynomial-time algorithms that given an election E decide if it is single-peaked and if so, compute a societal axis for it [BT86, ELÖ08] . Thus, just as in the case of single-crossing elections, we can freely assume that if an election is single-peaked then we are given a societal axis as well.
Chamberlin-Courant's Rule
We start our discussion by considering the complexity of winner-determination under Chamberlin-Courant's rule, for the case of single-crossing profiles.
Single-Crossing Profiles
A key observation in our analysis of Chamberlin-Courant's rule is that for single-crossing profiles there always exists an optimal k-CC-assignment function where the voters matched to a given candidate form contiguous blocks within the voters' order. In what follows, we will say that assignments of this form have the contiguous blocks property. We believe that this property is desirable from the social choice perspective: it means that voters who are represented by the same candidate are quite similar, which makes it easier for the candidate to act in a way that reflects the preferences of the group he represents. Later, we will see that the contiguous blocks property also has useful algorithmic implications.
Lemma 5 Let E = (C, V ) be a single-crossing election, where
, every dissatisfaction function α for m candidates, and every ℓ ∈ {ℓ 1 , ℓ ∞ }, there is an optimal k-CC assignment Φ for E under α-ℓ-CC such that for each candidate c i ∈ C, if Φ −1 (c i ) = ∅ then there are two integers, t i and
Proof Fix a single-crossing election E = (C, V ) with C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } and V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), and let Φ be an optimal k-CC-assignment function for E under α-ℓ-CC. We assume without loss of generality that for each voter v i in V , the candidate Φ(v i ) is v i 's most preferred candidate is Φ(V ). Let c j be v 1 's least preferred candidate in Φ(V ). Now consider some voter v i such that Φ(v i ) = c j . We have Φ(v i ′ ) = c j for every voter v i ′ such that i ′ > i. Indeed, suppose for the sake of contradiction that Φ(v i ′ ) = c k for k = j. By our choice of c j we have c k ≻ 1 c j . On the other hand, we have c j ≻ i c k and c k ≻ i ′ c j , a contradiction with E being a single-crossing election. Hence, the voters that are matched to c j by Φ form a consecutive block at the end of the preference profile.
To see that for each c ∈ Φ(V ) it holds that voters in Φ −1 (c) form a consecutive block, it suffices to delete c j and the voters that are matched to c j from the profile, decrease k by one, and repeat the same argument.
✷ Lemma 5 suggests a dynamic programming algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant's rule.
Theorem 6 For every family α of polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction functions and for ℓ ∈ {ℓ 1 , ℓ ∞ }, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that given a single-crossing election E and a positive integer k finds an optimal k-CC assignment for E under α-ℓ-CC.
Proof Let E = (C, V ) be our input single-crossing election, where C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }, V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and v 1 has preference order c 1 ≻ · · · ≻ c m , and let k be the target parliament size.
For
, and t ∈ [k] we define A[i, j, t] to be the optimal ℓ-aggregated dissatisfaction that can be achieved with a t-CC-assignment function when considering subelection (C j , V i ), where C j = {c 1 , . . . , c j } and
It is easy to see that for every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] \ {1} and k ∈ [t] \ {1} the following recursive relation holds (in the equation below, we abuse notation and treat ℓ as the respective norm on real vectors, i.e., we assume that it maps a list of values to their sum (when ℓ = ℓ 1 ) or their maximum (when ℓ = ℓ ∞ )):
The idea of this recursive relation is to guess the first voter v i * +1 to be represented by c j ; the optimal representation of the preceding voters is found recursively, for assembly size t − 1. To take care of the possibility that c j does not participate in the solution, we also take 
For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], and t ≥ j, we have A[i, j, t] = 0 (we match each voter to her top candidate). These conditions suffice for our recursion to be well-defined. Using dynamic programming, we can compute in polynomial time (in fact, in time O(mn 2 k)) the optimal dissatisfaction of the voters and a parliament that achieves it. ✷
Extension to Profiles with Bounded Single-Crossing Width
Following the ideas of Cornaz, Galand, and Spanjaard [CGS12, CGS13], we can extend our algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant's rule to profiles with so-called bounded single-crossing width.
Definition 7 A set D, D ⊆ C, is a clone set in an election E = (C, V ) if each voter in V ranks the candidates from D consecutively (but not necessarily in the same order).
Definition 8 We say that an election E = (C, V ) has single-crossing width (respectively, single-peaked width) at most w if there exists a partition of C into sets D 1 , . . . , D t such that (a) for each i ∈ [t] the set D i is a clone set in E and |D i | ≤ w, and (b) if we contract each D i in each vote to a single candidate d i , then the resulting preference profile is single-crossing (respectively, single-peaked).
Profiles with small single-crossing width may arise, e.g., in parliamentary elections where the candidates are divided into (small) parties and the voters have single-crossing preferences over the parties, but not necessarily over the candidates. Using the same techniques as Cornaz et al., we obtain the following result.
Proposition 9 For every family α of polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction functions and for every ℓ ∈ {ℓ 1 , ℓ ∞ }, there is an algorithm that given an election E = (C, V ) with
. . , v n ) whose single-crossing width is bounded by w, a partition of C into clone sets that witnesses this width bound, and a positive integer k, finds an optimal k-CC assignment for E under α-ℓ-CC, and runs in time poly(m, n, k, 2 w ).
Proof sketch Let E = (C, V ) be our input election, and let D 1 , . . . , D s be a partition of C witnessing that the single-crossing width of E is at most w; assume that the order of the sets D 1 , . . . , D s is such that the preference order of the first voter in V is of the form
We first observe that Lemma 5 generalizes easily to elections with a given partition into clone sets. Specifically, there exists an optimal k-CC assignment Φ for E under α-ℓ-CC, where for each clone set D i , if Φ −1 (D i ) = ∅ (that is, if at least one candidate from D i is assigned to some voter) then: (a) there are two integers, t i and
That is, the voters matched to the candidates from a given clone set form a consecutive block within the voter order. Now it is easy to modify our dynamic programming algorithm for profiles with bounded single-crossing width. We guess an integer j ∈ [s], a subset D ′ j of D j (the candidates from D j to join the assembly), and a voter v i = v n such that voters v i+1 , . . . , v n are represented by the candidates from D ′ j . Note that assigning the candidates from D ′ j to these voters optimally is easy under Chamberlin-Courant's rule: each voter gets her most preferred candidate from D ′ j . An optimal representation for v 1 , . . . , v i is found recursively (for an appropriately smaller assembly). To implement guessing, we try all possible choices of j, all possible subsets of D j , and all possible choices of v i , and we use dynamic programming to implement the recursive calls efficiently, just as in the perfectly single-crossing case. Since there are only s2 w |V | possibilities to consider at each guessing step and s ≤ |C|, we obtain the desired bound on the running time.
✷ Naturally, for this result to be useful, we need an efficient algorithm that computes single-crossing width of a profile and an appropriate division into clone sets. Fortunately, such an algorithm is provided by Cornaz et al. [CGS13] . (Interestingly, a very similar problem of finding a division into clones that results in a single-crossing election with as many candidates as possible is NP-hard [EFS12] ). As a consequence, we have the following corollary (see the books [Nie06, DF99] for an introduction to fixed-parameter complexity theory).
Corollary 10 For every family α of polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction functions and for every ℓ ∈ {ℓ 1 , ℓ ∞ }, the problem of winner determination for α-ℓ-CC is fixedparameter tractable with respect to the single-crossing width of the input profile.
Monroe's Rule
The results of Betzler et al. [BSU13] suggest that winner determination under Monroe's rule tends to be harder than winner determination under Chamberlin-Courant's rule. In this section, we show that this is also the case for single-crossing profiles: we prove that for the utilitarian variant of Monroe's rule with Borda dissatisfaction function (perhaps the most natural variant of Monroe's rule) computing winners is NP-hard, even for single-crossing elections. We then complement this hardness result by showing that for the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule winner determination is easy if we additionally assume that the preferences are narcissistic.
Hardness for General Single-Crossing Profiles
This section is devoted to proving that winner determination under Monroe's rule is NPhard. The main idea of the proof is to reduce the problem of winner determination for unrestricted profiles to the case of single-crossing profiles.
Theorem 11 Finding a set of winners under α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe voting rule is NP-hard, even for single-crossing elections.
The proof of this theorem is somewhat involved. We first need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 12 Consider an election E = (C, V ) with C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }, V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ). Let A and B be two disjoint sets of candidates such that |A| = |B| = mn. For each c i ∈ C, there is a single-crossing election Adj V (A, c i , B) with candidate set A ∪ B ∪ {c i } and voter
, and the profile
Proof Set A = {a 1 , . . . , a mn } and B = {b 1 , . . . , b mn }. Fix a candidate c i ∈ C. We build the election Adj V (A, c i , B) as follows. We set v ′ 1 's preference order to be
For 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, we build the preference order of voter v j+1 based on the preference order already constructed for v j . Given that the preference order of v j is of the form
we construct the preference order of v j+1 either by moving some of the candidates from B to precede c i or by moving some of the candidate from A to follow c i . Specifically, we do the following. First, we compute
then we set v j+1 's preference order to be
If d < 0 then we set v j+1 's preference order to be
If d = 0 then we set v j+1 's preference order to be the same as v j 's. Clearly, to construct each vote it suffices to shift forward or backward a block of at most m candidates and since both A and B contain mn candidates, doing so is always possible. Finally, it is clear that we never change the relative order of the candidates within A and within B, and that the resulting profile is single-crossing, even if we prepend v ′ 0 and append v ′ n+1 to it. ✷ Lemma 13 For every pair of positive integers k, n such that k divides n, and every set C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } of candidates, there is a single-crossing profile R(C) with ( n k + 1)m voters such that each candidate c i ∈ C is ranked first by exactly ( 
It is clear that a thus-constructed profile is single-crossing. Note that the preference order of the last voter in this profile is the reverse of the preference order of the first voter. ✷
We extend the notation introduced in Lemma 13 to apply to orders of candidates. That is, if C → is an order of candidates in C, then by R(C → ) we denote the election that we would construct in Lemma 13 if the first voter's preference order was C → (i.e., if we took c 1 to be the top candidate according to C → , c 2 to be the second one, and so on). By R −1 (C → ) Table 1 : The profile used in the proof of Theorem 11. For each voter list V i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, and for each voter v in V i we list the (sets of) candidates in the order of v's preference (we omit the "≻" symbol for readability). Whenever we list a set of candidates as a part of an order, we assume that the candidates in this set are ordered in some fixed, easily-computable way (for candidates in H we fix this order to be h 1 ≻ · · · ≻ h m−k ). Further, when in a line describing a preference order of an entire collection of voters V r = (v 1 , . . . , v s ) (specifically, for us r is either 2, 4, or 5, and s is the number of voters in this list of voters) we include a profile V ′ = (v ′ 1 , . . . , v ′ s ) (in our case V ′ is either an R-profile or an Adj-profile), then we mean that for each voter v i , i ∈ [s], in V r , this part of this voter's preference order is the preference order of v ′ i in V ′ .
we denote an order C ′ → of the candidates in C such that R(C ′ → ) produces an election where the last voter has preference order C → . With these lemmas and notation available, we are ready to give our proof of Theorem 11.
Proof of Theorem 11
Let I be an instance of the problem of finding k winners under α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe rule, and let (C, V ) be the election considered in I. Set n = |V | and m = |C|. We assume that n is divisible by k and that n > k (computing α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe winners is still NP-hard under these assumptions [BSU13, SFS13b] ). We will show how to construct in polynomial time an instance I sc of the problem of finding winners under α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe where the election is single-crossing so that it is easy to extract the set of winners for I from the set of winners for I sc .
We construct I sc in the following way. First, we define the candidate set C sc to be the union of the following disjoint sets (we provide names of the candidates only where relevant and abbreviate The ordered list V sc of voters consists of the following five sublists (we only give names to those voters to whom we will refer directly later; whenever sufficient, we only give the number of voters in a given list):
We give the preferences of the voters in Table 1 . In the thus-defined profile our goal is to find a parliament of size k sc = |C sc |− (m − k). Consequently, each selected candidate should be assigned to n k + 1 voters. We claim that optimal solutions Φ sc for I sc satisfy the following conditions:
is a winner and is assigned to those voters from V 1 + V 2 that rank c in position |H| + 1 = m − k + 1 (note that only one of these candidates can be assigned to (some of the) voters in V 1 ).
(
is a winner and is assigned to those voters from V 5 that rank c in position |H| + 1 = m − k + 1.
(iii) Each candidate h i ∈ H is a winner and is assigned to n k + 1 voters from V 1 + V 2 + V 3 (exactly |H| voters from V 3 have some candidate from H assigned to them); each such voter ranks h i in position i.
(iv) Exactly k candidates from C ′ are winners. Each of them is assigned to n k voters in V 4 and to one voter in V 3 that ranks him highest.
(v) The k winners from C ′ (let us call them w 1 , . . . , w k ) are also α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe winners in I and each of them is assigned in I sc to the voters corresponding to those from the I-solution.
Let us now show that indeed the optimal solution is of this form. First, we make the following observations: (a) By a simple counting argument, at least k of the candidates from C ′ must be included in the optimal solution.
(b) For each candidate h i in H, if h i is part of the optimal solution then h i is ranked in the i-th position in the preference order of the voters to which h i is assigned (candidates from H are always ranked first, in the order h 1 ≻ · · · ≻ h m ).
(c) For each candidate c ∈ C sc \ (C ′ ∪ H), if c is included in the optimal solution then each voter to which c is assigned ranks c in position m − k + 1 or worse (this is because every voter's top m − k positions are taken by the candidates from H).
(d) Each voter in V 1 + V 2 + V 5 ranks each candidate in C ′ position worse than
(e) Each voter in V 4 ranks each candidate in C ′ in position better than
(g) For each candidate c ∈ C ′ , there is exactly one voter in V 3 that ranks c in a position no worse than
all other voters in V 3 rank c in a position worse than
Let Φ be an optimal assignment function among those that use exactly k candidates from C ′ . We claim that Φ satisfies conditions (i)-(iv). This is so, because assigning voters from V 4 to candidates other than those in C ′ will result in a strictly worse assignment (the assignment would get worse for the candidates in C ′ because of points (d), (e), (f) and (g), and it would not improve for the other candidates because of points (b) and (c)). Similarly, each of the k selected candidates from C ′ should be assigned to exactly one voter from V 3 -the one that ranks this candidate highest. Once we assign the k winners from C ′ to the voters in V 4 and to k voters in V 3 , the optimal way to complete the assignment is to do so as described in conditions (i)-(iv).
Let Φ be an optimal assignment function for I sc that uses exactly k candidates from C ′ and that satisfies conditions (i)-(iv). We now prove that it also satisfies condition (v). Consider a candidate c i ∈ C ′ that is included in the set of winners under Φ. Let V The total dissatisfaction of the voters assigned to c i under Φ is:
which shows that the dissatisfaction of the voters in I sc that are assigned to c i under Φ differs from the dissatisfaction of the respective voters in I, had they been assigned to c i , only by a value that depends on n, m, and k (but not on i). Thus condition (v) holds.
It remains to show that an optimal assignment function for I sc uses exactly k candidates from C ′ . Let Φ sc be an optimal assignment function for I sc that satisfies conditions (i)-(v) (and thus uses exactly k candidates from C ′ ). Let Φ ′ be an assignment function for I sc that uses more thank k candidates from C ′ . We will show that the total dissatisfaction under Φ ′ is higher than under Φ sc . It is easy to see that the average dissatisfaction of the voters in Φ −1 sc (C sc \ C ′ ) under Φ sc is lower or equal than that of the voters in (
this follows by contrasting properties (i)-(iii) and observations (b) and (c)).
By the same reasoning as in the proof of property (v), we note that for each candidate c i ∈ C ′ , the dissatisfaction of the voters that Φ ′ assigns to c i can be lower bounded by the dissatisfaction for the case where c i is assigned to the voter from V 3 that ranks c i highest and to n k voters from V 4 that rank c i highest. The voter from V 3 ranks c i in a position no better than |H|+ j |E j |+ j |F j |+ |E|− |E i | and each of the V 4 voters ranks c i in position no better than |H| + j |D j | + (m − i)(2mn + 1) + mn. Thus, under Φ ′ , the dissatisfaction of the voters to whom c i is assigned can be lower bounded by:
Similarly, if c i is selected under Φ sc then the dissatisfaction of the voters to whom c i is assigned under Φ sc can be upper bounded as follows (the idea of the upper bound is similar to the one for the lower bound above, except now we take the upper bound regarding the position of c i in the preference orders of voters from V 4 ):
Note that neither of the bounds depends on i and that the difference between the upper bound for Φ sc and the lower bound for Φ ′ is m n k . Thus for each subset of k candidates from C ′ that are assigned under Φ ′ , the total dissatisfaction these candidates impose is, at best, better by an additive factor of mn than the dissatisfaction imposed by the k candidates selected from C ′ under Φ sc . However, under Φ ′ there are at least n k voters outside of V 4 that are assigned to candidates in C ′ . Each of these voters ranks the candidate assigned to her in a position worse than p 2 > 2m 2 n + m. On the other hand, under C i each of these voters is assigned to some candidate that she ranks in a position no worse than m − k + 1. Since
We conclude that an optimal assignment function Φ sc assigns voters to exactly k candidates from C ′ and that the dissatisfaction of the voters in I sc under Φ sc is equal to the optimal dissatisfaction of the voters in I plus an easily computable value that depends on m, n, and k only. This completes the proof. ✷
Betzler et al. [BSU13] have shown a similar hardness result for single-peaked elections; however, their construction uses an artificial dissatisfaction function rather than Borda. The complexity of winner determination under α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe for single-peaked elections is still an open question. As our result answers this question in the case of single-crossing elections, it is tempting to ask if our proof approach could be used for single-peaked elections. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case. The difficulty lies in jointly implementing voters V 3 + V 4 (and, in particular, positioning the candidates c 1 , . . . , c m ).
ℓ ∞ -Monroe for Single-Crossing Narcissistic Profiles
Given our hardness result for Monroe's rule, it is natural to ask if we can further restrict the problem of computing Monroe's winners to obtain tractability. To this end, we focus on the egalitarian version of Monroe'e rule (the results of Betzler et al. [BSU13] suggest that it is likely to be more tractable than the utilitarian version of this rule), and consider an additional domain restriction, namely, narcissistic preferences.
An election is said to be narcissistic if every candidate is ranked first by at least one voter. Intuitively, such elections arise when candidates are allowed to vote for themselves. This notion was introduced by Bartholdi and Trick [BT86] , and was used in the context of fully proportional representation by Cornaz et al. [CGS12] . It turns out that it is useful in our setting, too: we will show that the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule admits an efficient winner determination algorithm under single-crossing narcissistic preferences.
Lemma 14 Let E = (C, V ) be a single-crossing narcissistic election with C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }, V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), where v 1 has preference order c 1 ≻ · · · ≻ c m . For every k ∈ [m] and every dissatisfaction function α for m candidates, there is an optimal k-Monroe assignment Φ for E under α-ℓ ∞ -Monroe such that for each candidate c i ∈ C, if Φ −1 (c i ) = ∅ then there are two integers, t i and
Moreover, for each i < j such that Φ −1 (c i ) = ∅ and Φ −1 (c j ) = ∅ it holds that t ′ i < t j .
Proof Suppose that we seek a parliament of size k. Let α be some dissatisfaction function, let Φ be an optimal k-Monroe-assignment function for E under α-ℓ ∞ -Monroe, and let t be the smallest value such that under Φ each voter is assigned to a candidate that this voter ranks in position t or higher. We will now show how to transform Φ into the form required in the statement of the lemma. Let s = max{s ′ | there is v i such that Φ(v i ) = c s ′ }; that is, let c s be the last candidate in v 1 's preference order that is assigned to some voters. Let n s be the number of voters to whom c s is assigned. We claim that there is a k-Monroe-assignment function Φ ′′ with the same egalitarian utility as that of Φ that assigns c s to the voters v n−ns+1 , . . . , v n .
If Φ itself satisfies this requirement, we are done. Otherwise, we transform it as follows. Pick the smallest i such that Φ(v i ) = c s . There must be some voter v j , j > i, such that Φ(v j ) = c s (otherwise Φ would have satisfied our requirement). Let c r = Φ(v j ). We set
Clearly. Φ ′ is a k-Monroe-assignment function for E and we now show that
We consider the following two cases.
v i prefers c s to c r . Since v 1 prefers c r to c s and we assume that v i prefers c s to c r , it must be the case that v j also prefers c s to c r . Further, since E is narcissistic, there is a voter v ℓ , ℓ < i, who ranks c r first. This means that v i ranks c r at least as highly as v j does. Indeed, otherwise there would be a candidate c such that v i prefers c to c r and v j prefers c r to c; this is impossible since v ℓ prefers c r to c and E is single-crossing. This means that ℓ ∞ (Φ ′ ) ≤ ℓ ∞ (Φ).
v i prefers c r to c s . This means that assigning c r to v i does not increase the dissatisfaction induced by the assignment. We have to show that assigning c s to v j does not increase it either. If v j prefers c s to c r , then we are done. Thus, we can assume that v j prefers c r to c s . Since V is narcissistic, there is a vote v q with q > j where c s is ranked first. This means that v j ranks c s at least as highly as v i does. Indeed, otherwise there would be some candidate c such that v i prefers c s to c, v j prefers c to c s , and v q prefers c s to c; this is impossible, since E is single-crossing.
This proves that Φ ′ is a k-Monroe assignment with egalitarian dissatisfaction no worse than that of Φ. By repeating the same reasoning sufficiently many times, we eventually reach an assignment function Φ ′′ where c s is assigned exactly to the voters v n−ns+1 , . . . , v n : each iteration gets us closer to this goal. We then continue in the same way to handle the rest of the elected candidates. That is, we set s (2) = max{s ′ | there is v i such that Φ ′′ (v i ) = c s ′ and s ′ < s}, we set n s (2) to be the number of voters to which Φ ′′ assigns c s (2) , and transform Φ ′′ to be a k-Monroe-assignment function that assigns c s (2) to voters v n−ns−n s (2) +1 , . . . , v n−ns , and c s to voters v n−ns+1 , . . . , v n . We repeat in the same manner until we reach a k-Monroe-assignment function that satisfies the statement of the lemma. ✷ Based on Lemma 14, it is easy to construct a dynamic programming algorithm for ℓ ∞ -Monroe.
Theorem 15 For every family α of polynomial-time computable dissatisfaction functions, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that given a single-crossing narcissistic election E and a positive integer k finds an optimal k-Monroe assignment for E under α-ℓ ∞ -Monroe.
Proof Let E = (C, V ) be a single-crossing narcissistic election, let α be our dissatisfaction function, and let k be the size of the parliament that we seek. We assume that C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }, V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), and that v 1 's preference order is c 1 ≻ · · · ≻ c m . Based on Lemma 14, we give a dynamic programming algorithm for α-ℓ ∞ -Monroe.
For each i, j, t, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, 0 ≤ t ≤ k, we define A[i, j, t] to be the lowest dissatisfaction that one can achieve by assigning to the voters v 1 , . . . , v i exactly t candidates from the set C j = {c 1 , . . . , c j } in such a way that each candidate is assigned to either ⌈ n k ⌉ consecutive voters or to ⌊ n k ⌋ consecutive voters; we set A[i, j, t] = ∞ if such an assignment does not exist. In particular, for each j we have A[0, j, 0] = 0 and we can compute in time O(1) the value A[i, j, t] whenever at least one of the arguments is 0. We also adopt the convention that A[i, j, t] = ∞ whenever at least one of the arguments is negative. Further, for every pair of integers i, i ′ with i ≤ i ′ and every candidate c j , we define pos(i, i ′ , c j ) to be the worst position of candidate c j in the votes that belong to the set {v t | max{1, i} ≤ t ≤ min{n, i ′ }}.
It is easy to see that the following equality holds for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], t ∈ [k] (we take the minimum over an empty set to be ∞):
Using this equality and standard dynamic programming, it is easy to compute A[n, m, k] and the k-Monroe-assignment function that achieves this dissatisfaction in polynomial time.
To be more precise, computing A[n, m, k] requires time O(nm 2 k); to achieve this running time, we first compute all the necessary values pos(i− [BSU13] ). Thus, if we only care about polynomial-time computability, Theorem 15 does not appear to be useful. However, there are two reasons to prefer the algorithm described in Theorem 15. First, our algorithm is considerably faster: the running time of Betzler et al.'s algorithm is O(n 3 m 3 k 3 ), while for our algorithm it is O(nm 2 k). Second, our algorithm produces an assignment that has the contiguous blocks property. In contrast, in Section 5 we show that this is not necessarily the case for the algorithm of Betzler et al.
Contiguous Blocks Property: Counterexamples
We will now explore the limitations of the algorithmic approach that is based on the contiguous blocks property.
First, we provide an example of a single-crossing election such that all optimal assignments under Monroe's rule do not possess the contiguous blocks property; in fact, the approximation ratio of every algorithm that produces assignments with this property is Ω(m). This result holds both for the utilitarian and for the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule.
Example 16 Let C = {c 1 , c 2 } ∪ A ∪ B be a set of candidates, where |A| = |B| = m. Let V = V 1 + V 2 + V 3 + V 4 be a list of voters, where each V i contains n voters. Voters in each V i have identical preference orders, defined as follows.
We seek a 2-member parliament, and use Borda misrepresentation function α B .
If we partition voters into contiguous blocks, then the best we can do is to assign c 1 to V 1 + V 2 and c 2 to V 3 + V 4 (or the other way round), achieving dissatisfaction of n(m + 2) and m + 1 under α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe and α B -ℓ ∞ -Monroe, respectively. In contrast, if we assign c 1 to V 1 + V 4 and c 2 to V 2 + V 3 , then the total dissatisfaction under α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe and α B -ℓ ∞ -Monroe is 2n and 1, respectively.
Further, even for narcissistic single-crossing elections, if we consider the utilitarian version of Monroe's rule, imposing the contiguous blocks property may lead to suboptimal solutions.
Example 17 We consider the set C = {a, b, c, d, e, f } of candidates and the following twelve voters (the profile is clearly narcissistic and it is easy to check that it is single-crossing):
We seek a 2-member parliament, and our voting rule is α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe. If we require the assignment function to have the contiguous blocks property, then the unique optimal solution assigns b to each voter in V 1 = (v 1 , . . . , v 6 ) and d to each voter in V 2 = (v 7 , . . . , v 12 ). Under this assignment the total misrepresentation of the voters in V 1 and V 2 is given by 4 and 9, respectively, so the optimal total misrepresentation for assignments with the contiguous blocks property is 13.
On the other hand, without the contiguous blocks property, we can assign candidate e to voters v 1 , v 2 , v 9 , v 10 , v 11 , v 12 , and candidate c to voters v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 , v 7 , v 8 , for the total misrepresentation of 11. Indeed, we will now argue that this is the unique optimal solution.
For each candidate x, set lowest(x) = min i∈I α B (pos v i (x)) | I ⊆ [12], |I| = 6 . Intuitively, lowest(x) corresponds to assigning x in the best possible way. We have lowest(a) = 9, lowest(b) = 4, lowest(c) = 1 lowest(d) = 9, lowest(e) = 10, lowest(f ) = 14.
Thus each assignment function that gives total misrepresentation of at most 11 produces one of the following sets of winners: {a, c}, {b, c}, {c, d}, or {c, e}. Now, if the set of winners is {a, c} or {b, c}, the total misprepresentation is at least 12, because for each voter in (v 9 , v 10 , v 11 , v 12 ) assigning a candidate from either of these sets results in a misrepresentation of at least 3.
Consider the candidates c and d. If each voter were assigned to her more preferred candidate among these two, we would get a 2-CC-assignment function with misrepresentation 11. However, under this assignment 8 voters are assigned to c, so the best Monroe assignment for these two candidates has misrepresentation at least 12. Finally, it is clear that no assignment function that uses c and e can have a lower misrepresentation than 11 and we have seen that such a 2-Monroe assignment exists.
To summarize, imposing the contiguous blocks property may lead to a suboptimal assignment whose set of winners is disjoint from the one for the optimal assignment, even in a narcissistic single-crossing election.
We now consider single-peaked preferences. Note that the definition of a single-peaked election does not impose any restrictions on the voter ordering, and therefore it is not immediately clear what is the correct way to extend the contiguous blocks property to this setting. However, it seems natural to order the voters according to their most preferred candidates (using the candidate order given by the axis), breaking ties according to their second most preferred candidate, etc. That is, consider an election E = (C, V ) that is single-peaked with respect to the order c 1 ✁ · · · ✁ c m . A voter with a preference order c i 1 ≻ · · · ≻ c im can be identified with the string i 1 . . . i m . We reorder the voters so that if i < j then the string associated with v i is lexicographically smaller than or equal to the string associated with v j .
We then ask if for every single-peaked election there exists an optimal assignment for Chamberlin-Courant's rule or Monroe's rule that satisfies the contiguous blocks property with respect to this ordering. We will now show that the answer is "no", both for the egalitarian and the utilitarian version of both rules. Indeed, just as in Example 16, imposing the contiguous blocks property has a cost of Ω(m). In fact, it can be shown that all axes witnessing that E is single-peaked have the property that a, b, c, and d appear in the center of the axis, ordered as a > b > c > d or d > c > b > a (this is implied, e.g., by the analysis in [ELÖ08] ). Thus the ordering of the voters induced by the axis is (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 ). We seek a 2-member parliament, and use Borda misrepresentation function α B .
Suppose that we assign a to v 1 and v 3 and d to v 2 and v 4 . Then the total dissatisfaction under α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe and α B -ℓ ∞ -Monroe is 4 and 2, respectively. However, if we impose the contiguous blocks property, then the optimal assignment for Monroe's is to assign b to v 1 and v 2 , and c to v 3 and v 4 ; this results in total dissatisfaction of 2(m + 1) and m + 1 with respect to α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe and α B -ℓ ∞ -Monroe, respectively. For α B -ℓ 1 -CC, we can obtain a somewhat better dissatisfaction than for α B -ℓ 1 -Monroe, by assigning b to v 1 , v 2 , and v 3 , and assigning d to v 4 . However, even for Chamberlin-Courant's rule under every assignment that has the contiguous blocks property, at least one voter will be assigned to a candidate that she ranks in position m + 2 or lower, so the total (egalitarian or utilitarian) dissatisfaction will be at least m + 1.
Example 18 illustrates that our algorithms for Chamberlin-Courant's rule (for singlecrossing elections) and for the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule (for single-crossing narcissistic elections) are quite different from the algorithms for these problems proposed by Betzler et al. [BSU13] for single-peaked elections: even though all of these algorithms rely on dynamic programming, the dynamic program for single-peaked elections is very different from the one for single-crossing elections. As a consequence, if we apply Betzler et al.'s algorithm to a single-crossing narcissistic election, we may fail to get an assignment that satisfies the contiguous blocks property. Examples 16 and 17 further show that we cannot hope to extend Theorem 15 to all single-crossing elections, or to utilitarian preferences.
Conclusions
We have considered the complexity of winner determination under Chamberlin-Courant's and Monroe's rules, for the case of single-crossing profiles. We have presented a polynomialtime algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant's rule for single-crossing elections (and for elections that are close to being single-crossing in the sense of having bounded single-crossing width), and an NP-hardness proof for Monroe's rule for the same setting. Our results further strengthen the intuition that Monroe's rule is algorithmically harder than ChamberlinCourant's rule. Similar conclusions follow from the work of Betzler et al. [BSU13] and Skowron et al. [SFS13b] Inspired by our negative result for Monroe's rule, we have sought further natural restrictions on voters' preferences. To this end, we considered single-crossing narcissistic profiles and developed an efficient algorithm for the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule under this preference restriction. However, we showed that our approach does not extend to general single-crossing elections, or to the utilitarian version of Monroe's rule.
Perhaps the most obvious direction for future research that is suggested by our work is understanding the computational complexity of the utilitarian version of Monroe's rule for single-crossing narcissistic elections and of egalitarian version of Monroe's rule for singlecrossing profiles. While we have shown that approaches based on the contiguous blocks property are bound to fail, other approaches may be more successful. Going in another direction, perhaps it is possible to obtain efficient algorithms for our restricted domains and for dissatisfaction functions other than Borda.
